The Structure of Phenomenal Justification

Bibliographic Data

ID21293450
AuthorsUriah Kriegel (Rice University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume101
Issue2
Pages282-297
Publication date2023-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2021.1978513
OpenAlexW3200298243
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited20

An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: what is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology—including quite similar ones—remain ‘epistemically inert’? I will argue that, to overcome this objection, the phenomenal dogmatist should incorporate into her view a general principle—I call it the ‘experiential attitude/doxastic content link’ principle—that essentially extends the view from the perceptual case to other phenomenal states

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Physicalism · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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