Descartes on Numerical Identity and Time
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293469 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Morrison (0000-0003-1548-6392, Barnard College, Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 230-246 |
| Publication date | 2022-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1907759 |
| OpenAlex | W3175193444 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 36 |
According to most contemporary philosophers, the Indiscernibility of Identicals is obviously true. We might therefore expect earlier philosophers to endorse it. But I will use a puzzle about identity over time to argue that Descartes would reject it
Aesthetics · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Real Time II
Cartesian Metaphysics
Ockham on Identity and Distinction
Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671
Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World
Scotus on Metaphysics
Metaphysics
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
Descartes' Meditations
Ockham and Ockhamism
Reasons and Persons
The Problem of Change
Presentism and Truthmaking
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |