Lies in Art

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21293472
AutoresDaisy Dixon (0000-0002-7781-282X, University of Cambridge, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume100
Fascículo1
Páginas25-39
Data de publicação2022-01-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1844772
OpenAlexW3108864813
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas19

This paper aims to show that any account of how artworks lie must acknowledge (I) that artworks can lie at different levels of their content—what I call ‘surface’ and ‘deep’—and (II) that, for an artwork to lie at a given level, a norm of truthful communication such as Grice’s Maxim of Quality must apply to it. A corollary is that it’s harder than you might think for artworks to lie: Quality is not automatically ‘switched on’ during our engagement with art. However, I show how a work’s curation and genre-membership can ‘switch on’ Quality, allowing artworks to lie at different levels

Aesthetics · Art · Corollary · Epistemology · Grice · Linguistics · Maxim · Norm (philosophy) · Pure mathematics · Quality (philosophy) · Sociology · Work of art · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual Culture and Art Theory