Fallibility and Dogmatism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293501 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bernhard Salow (0000-0002-4437-8211, Northeast Catholic College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 23-38 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381692 |
| OpenAlex | W4401464983 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 29 |
The strongest version of the dogmatism puzzle argues that, when we know something, we should resolve to ignore or avoid evidence against it. The best existing responses are fallibilist, and hold that decisions should be governed by underlying probabilities rather than our knowledge. I argue that this is an overreaction: by paying close attention to the principles governing belief-revision, and to subtly different ways in which knowledge can govern decision-making, we can dissolve the puzzle without the need for controversial theoretical commitments. The resulting solution demonstrates fruitful and underexplored points of interaction between ‘traditional’ epistemology and ‘formal’ theories of belief-revision, and clears the ground for more systematic theorizing about how and when we should be open to changing our minds
Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
Knowledge and Lotteries
Between Probability and Certainty
Belief and the Will
Accuracy and Coherence
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment
Stealing Harman’s Thought
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Epistemology Normalized
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
The Value of Biased Information
On the Principle of Total Evidence
Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |