Carnapian Neo-Fregeanism and the Bad Company Objection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293571 |
|---|---|
| Authors | W A Cohen (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-16 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2026.2688287 |
| OpenAlex | W7167597744 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 37 |
Hume’s Principle, which is the principle on which neo-Fregeans wish to build arithmetic, is an abstraction principle. Many abstraction principles are unacceptable to the neo-Fregean, for instance because they are inconsistent or because they are inconsistent together with Hume’s Principle. What differentiates Hume’s Principle from these unacceptable abstraction principles? This question, which captures the so-called bad company objection, has proved difficult to answer and continues to plague the neo-Fregean programme. In this paper, I draw on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap to develop a Carnapian neo-Fregeanism. I show how the Carnapian neo-Fregean can deal relatively straightforwardly with the bad company objection. I also consider why a Carnapian should be attracted to the neo-Fregean programme and, finally, argue that some of the pressing problems which have developed from the bad company objection are no issue for the Carnapian neo-Fregean
Liability · Perspective (graphical) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |