Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox

Bibliographic Data

ID21293588
AuthorsSzymon Bogacz (0000-0003-2371-1131, Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume102
Issue1
Pages206-220
Publication date2024-01-02
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2023.2172592
OpenAlexW4320716567
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox

Argument (complex analysis) · Buddhism · Contradiction · Epistemology · Linguistics · Sentence · Theology · Chemistry · Historical Philosophy and Science · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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Open DOIOpen Access