Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption
A Response to Wodak
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293591 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cristian Larroulet Philippi (0000-0001-5793-4670, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 512-518 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-02 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642 |
| OpenAlex | W4382929543 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in making average comparisons even if their measurements are not linear
Affect (linguistics) · Empirical research · Epistemology · Linearity · Physics · Political science · Politics · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Law · Philosophy · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |