Precision and Perceptual Clarity

Bibliographic Data

ID21293598
AuthorsJonna Vance (Northern Arizona University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume99
Issue2
Pages379-395
Publication date2021-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1767663
OpenAlexW3034237428
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited34

When we see objects blurrily, in the periphery, or in dim light, we often experience their features unclearly. This paper argues that perceptual clarity is a dimension along which experiences vary, distinct from their distal contents. Drawing on models in perception science, the paper accounts for clarity by using the probabilistic notion of precision. The account’s first part is ecumenical: it says that experiences carry information about the precision of the representations from which each distal content of experience was selected and that this precision information accounts for perceptual clarity. The account’s second part entails that experiences carry the relevant precision information in the manner in which their distal contents are represented. The precision account of clarity is shown to conform to common intuitions about experiences’ contents and accuracy conditions. And it is used to illustrate how experiences could assign probability distributions over distal possibilities, even while experiences’ contents are non-probabilistic

CLARITY · Dimension (graph theory) · Epistemology · Perception · Probabilistic logic · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Mathematics · Multisensory perception and integration · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms

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