Do Mechanisms Matter for Inferences About Consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID21293633
AuthorsAndy Mckilliam (0000-0001-8223-3817, National Taiwan University, Monash University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-17
Publication date2025-12-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2025.2587709
OpenAlexW4416975121
LanguageEN
References cited56

What should we make of systems that behave just like conscious creatures but operate via mechanisms that are profoundly different from our own? How should we even think about mechanistic similarity and difference in this context? To answer these questions, I take a closer look at the inferential machinery that allows us to justifiably draw conclusions about consciousness in others. I argue that inferences about consciousness in others are best viewed as involving analogical inferences grounded in explanatory considerations. I conclude that profound mechanistic difference severs the evidential link between behavioural evidence and subjective experience. I then draw on recent developments within the mechanistic philosophy of science to motivate a conception of mechanistic similarity that is not wedded to similarity of physical substrate and outline a strategy for resolving disputes about whether it is cognitive similarity or neural similarity that matters for inferences about consciousness

Affect (linguistics) · Counterfactual thinking · Inference · Free Will and Agency · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Visual perception and processing mechanisms