Fit-related Reasons to Inquire
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293658 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Genae Matthews (0009-0006-0091-0233, University of North Carolina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 244-259 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2025.2505617 |
| OpenAlex | W4410601651 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 29 |
Recent philosophical work on inquiry yields important results about when it is appropriate to inquire and to what extent norms on inquiry are compatible with other epistemic norms. However, philosophers have been remarkably silent on the matter of what questions we ought to take up in the first place. In this paper, I take up this question, and argue that moral considerations constitute fit-related, right-kind reasons to adopt interrogative attitudes towards, and so inquire about, particular questions. This is a conclusion of more general interest, because—as I explain—we might think that moral considerations are at best wrong-kind reasons for attitudes. If my contentions are right, then there is at least one kind of attitude—namely interrogative attitudes—of which this is not true
Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology
IX—Moral Encroachment
What we epistemically owe to each other
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship
Fittingness First
Five Types of Ethical Theory
Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour
The Cognitive Demands of Friendship
Bearing Witness
Group Inquiry
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism
Inquiring Minds Want to Improve
The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
The Epistemic and the Zetetic
Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays
Against Beneficence
The Normative and the Evaluative
The right and the wrong kind of reasons
One Kind of Asking
| Highly cited | No |
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