What are the Causal Bases of Dispositions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293680
AutoresMaría Ferreira Ruiz (0000-0002-6931-1072, Bielefeld University), Fabian Hundertmark (0000-0001-8784-9290, Bielefeld University)
Año2025
Volumen103
Número3
Páginas814-831
Fecha de publicación2025-07-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2024.2408689
OpenAlexW4404367827
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas28

Even though the talk of causal bases is commonplace in traditional and contemporary discussions about dispositions, the concept of causal bases has never been systematically investigated. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing the causal-grounding account. This account takes two roles as definitory for causal bases. First, causal bases are possible causes of disposition manifestations. Second, causal bases are metaphysical grounds of disposition instantiations. In this paper, we show that the causal-grounding account (CGA) achieves crucial distinctions (for example between causal bases and manifestation conditions), captures relevant traditional features of causal bases, and can be invoked to support the causal efficacy of disposition instantiations. At the same time, CGA does not require that causal bases have to be categorical or intrinsic. This, in turn, allows us to remain neutral concerning fundamental properties, the existence of dispositional or extrinsic causal bases, multi-track dispositions, and the reducibility of dispositions. This neutrality grants the suitability of our account for different philosophical projects and discussions

Epistemology · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science