Smartphones

Parts of Our Minds? Or Parasites

Bibliographic Data

ID21293719
AuthorsRachael L Brown (0000-0003-2709-1945, Australian National University), Robert C Brooks (0000-0001-6926-0781, UNSW)
Year2026
Volume104
Issue1
Pages1-16
Publication date2026-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2025.2504070
OpenAlexW4410792136
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited40

Smartphones are often assumed to be obvious examples of cognitive extension. We offer reasons to reject this assessment, arguing that modern smartphones (and the apps installed on them) are not cognitive extensions after all. Modern smartphones are designed to manipulate the attention and behaviour of users in ways that further the interests of the corporations that built them. In this they are importantly different from resources typically associated with the extended mind—such as notebooks, Scrabble racks and maps—which are not designed to manipulate or exploit users (even if they can be corrupted to these ends in some cases). It is not plausible for a part of the cognitive system to be designed to thwart the goals and desires of the user in the way a smartphone is. Given this, we argue, modern smartphones are better understood as external to, but symbiotic with, our minds, and, sometimes even parasitic on us, rather than as cognitive extensions. Thinking about them in this way better reflects the true nature of our relationship with them, and the ways that the relationship can both benefit and harm us

Cybernetics and Technology in Society · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Innovative Human-Technology Interaction · Philosophy · Psychology

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