Where Pains Are

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293721
AutoresErlend Owesen (0000-0002-4526-7783, Independent scholars), Arif Ahmed (0000-0001-7826-3335, Independent scholars)
Año2026
Páginas1-16
Fecha de publicación2026-05-05
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2026.2659878
OpenAlexW7160292810
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas25

The so-called pain-in-mouth argument is the step from (1) There is a pain in my finger, and (2) My finger is in my mouth, to (3) There is a pain in my mouth. According to Tye (Citation1995a, Citation1995b) and Carruthers (Citation2000), the best explanation of what is wrong or misleading with this argument appeals to the experiential theory of pain. This paper is about what a defender of the bodily theory of pain should say about (1)–(3). One alternative is the implicature approach (Reuter et al. Citation2019; Casser and Schiller Citation2021). We argue that this approach is inadequate. Instead, we propose a new approach—the mereological approach. This approach entails the bodily theory, and it does a better job of explaining what is wrong with the pain-in-mouth argument

Argument (complex analysis) · Experiential learning · Implicature · Mereology · Metaphysics · Reductio ad absurdum · Truth condition · Medical History and Innovations · Music Therapy and Health · Pediatric Pain Management Techniques