Expressivist Moral Abolitionism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293735 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Campbell (University of Maryland, Baltimore County, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 99 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 776-790 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2020.1815065 |
| OpenAlex | W3088797653 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Moral abolitionists argue that ordinary moral discourse has downsides substantial enough to warrant abandoning the discourse in favour of some replacement(s). Their most common critique is that the ‘realist’ character of moral discourse inhibits important forms of self-awareness. Until recently, metaethicists had operated on the assumption that abolitionism depends on error theory. To this day, there has been no discernible recognition that well-established metaethical views might strongly support abolitionism, despite rejecting error theory. Here I argue that expressivism supports abolitionism and fits very poorly with quasi-realism. That is because (1) the quasi-realist strategy for defeating error theory helps abolitionists by entailing that they have no need of error theory, (2) expressivist interpretations of belief in realism strongly support abolitionist critiques from self-awareness, and (3) there is an inherent instability between expressivism and quasi-realism, while abolitionism and expressivism fit very nicely together
Abolitionism · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Highly cited | No |
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