Who’s Your Ideal Listener

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293750
AutoresEthan Nowak (0000-0002-5141-3134, King's College London), Eliot Michaelson (0000-0002-2181-5423, King's College London)
Año2021
Volumen99
Número2
Páginas257-270
Fecha de publicación2021-04-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1741658
OpenAlexW3021817070
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas24

It is increasingly common for philosophers to rely on the notion of an idealised listener when explaining how the semantic values of context-sensitive expressions are determined. Some have identified the semantic values of such expressions, as used on particular occasions, with whatever an appropriately idealised listener would take them to be. Others have argued that, for something to count as the semantic value, an appropriately idealised listener should be able to recover it. Our aim here is to explore the range of ways that such idealisation might be worked out, and then to argue that none of these results in a very plausible theory. We conclude by reflecting on what this negative result reveals about the nature of meaning and responsibility

Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Meaning (existential) · Semantic theory of truth · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology