Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value

Bibliographic Data

ID21293754
AuthorsVuko Andrić (0000-0002-5491-0769, Bayreuth University and Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm), Anders Herlitz (0000-0002-9885-8106, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm)
Year2022
Volume100
Issue3
Pages595-604
Publication date2022-07-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2021.1920043
OpenAlexW3164006675
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited20

This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible

Beneficiary · Economics · Epistemology · Gratification · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory) · Positive economics · Rationality · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Finance · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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