Algorithmic Neutrality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293764 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Milo Phillips-Brown (0000-0003-2223-9445, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-21 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2026.2697031 |
| OpenAlex | W4323929320 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Algorithms wield increasing power over our lives. They can and often do wield that power unfairly, and much has been said about algorithmic fairness. In contrast, algorithmic neutrality has been largely neglected. I investigate algorithmic neutrality, asking: What is it? Is it possible? And what is its normative significance
Impossibility · Neutrality · Normative · Political science · Computer Science · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Law
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal
Two theories about adjectives
The Relevance of Algorithms
The case for comparability
Answering machines
Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion
Information structure in discourse
Liberal Neutrality
Shaping the Web
Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
Algorithmic bias
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |