Knowledge and the Onslaught of Desire
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293777 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarju Patel (0009-0001-9188-0837, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1078-1097 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2025.2481918 |
| OpenAlex | W4409163593 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 57 |
I argue in this paper against the orthodox view that knowledge entails belief. Granting that Radford's Unconfident examinee fails as a counterexample, this paper argues that the orthodox view faces another set of counterexamples that are importantly different from Radford’s: cases wherein knowledge that p and belief that not-p are compossible
Economics · Epistemology · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
The Opacity of MindAn Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
The Unity of Perception
Perplexities of Consciousness
On the Aim of Belief
How to speak of the colors
Belief and Acceptance
Belief is weak
Knowledge and Action
Brainstorms
Alief and Belief
Free Agency
Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
Addiction and the self
Resistant Beliefs, Responsive Believers
Attitude, Inference, Association
Desire as Belief
All Things Considered’
The evil demon in the lab
Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism
Delusional evidence-responsiveness
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
How Truth Governs Belief
Doxastic Deliberation
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings
Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise
Are We Luminous
Radford Revisiting
The Puzzle of Self-Deception
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |