Remarks on Technological Neutrality in Copyright Law as a Subject Matter Problem
Lessons From Canada
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21299779 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Abraham Drassinower (University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 50-83 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Cambridge Law Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0008-1973 • E-ISSN: 1469-2139 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0008197321001045 |
| OpenAlex | W4210873251 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
The paper argues that the principle of technological neutrality in copyright law is best grasped, not as a policy-driven imperative seeking to adapt copyright law to the exigencies of the digital environment, but rather as a principle immanent in the modern concept of copyright subject matter providing that merely technical or non-expressive uses of works of authorship do not attract liability. Technological neutrality is but a corollary of originality; that is, of the elementary proposition that copyright law protects original expression and nothing but original expression
Copyright law · Corollary · Digital Millennium Copyright Act · Epistemology · Expression (computer science) · Fair dealing · Fair use · Intellectual property · Law and economics · Liability · Net neutrality · Neutrality · Nothing · Political science · Proposition · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Subject matter · The Internet · Computer Science · Copyright and Intellectual Property · Intellectual Property Law · Law · Law, AI, and Intellectual Property · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|