Finding the British Google

Relaxing the Prohibition of Dual-Class Stock From the Premium-Tier of the London Stock Exchange

Bibliographic Data

ID21299803
AuthorsBobby V Reddy (0000-0002-6519-3160, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume79
Issue2
Pages315-348
Publication date2020-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Cambridge Law Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0008-1973 • E-ISSN: 1469-2139
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0008197320000379
OpenAlexW3124247846
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited38

There is a dearth of British tech-companies listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the LSE lacks a large, innovative tech-company such as Google. The UK Government, concerned as to the loss of UK tech-companies to foreign acquirors, views the encouragement of UK tech-firm listings as a policy priority. Dual-class stock, currently prohibited from the LSE Main Market's premium-tier, allows founders to list their firms, and retain majority-control, while holding significantly less of the cash-flow rights in the company. This article will broach the potential for dual-class stock to attract UK tech-company listings, and explore the benefits that dual-class stock can engender for UK tech-companies and their public shareholders. The risks of dual-class structures will also be discussed, but it will be shown that in a UK regulatory context, in relation to high-growth tech-companies, the risks may not be as severe as presumed, and easily moderated through judicious controls

Business · Context (archaeology) · Corporate governance · Listing (finance) · Shareholder · Stock (firearms) · Stock exchange · Stock market · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Governance and Law · Corporate Insolvency and Governance · Engineering · Finance

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