Reasoning from the impossible
Early medieval views on conditionals and counterpossibles
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21334893 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Irene Binini (0000-0001-5031-1710, University of Parma, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Pages | 1-24 |
| Publication date | 2024-02-05 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2312565 |
| OpenAlex | W4392734369 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
Impossible antecedents entered the scene of medieval logic around the 1120s and soon started to dominate this scene, becoming one of the most debated issues from the second half of the twelfth century onwards. This article focuses on theories of counterpossibles from this period and aims to offer an overview of the different responses offered by twelfth-century logicians on whether everything, something, or nothing follows from an impossible statement. Rather than trying to historically reconstruct the positions of the different authors – an operation that may be premature given the insufficient notions we still have of the authorship and dating of sources – I aim to provide a provisional map of the main arguments that were advanced in favour of or against the ex impossibili quodlibet principle. The article also aims to show that the strategies developed by twelfth-century logical schools in their approach to counterpossibles survive in logical discussions of the same topic during the thirteenth and the early fourteenth century, especially in the syncategoremata and sophistaria traditions
Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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