Rethinking Metametaphysics

Amie Thomasson's new book, Rethinking Metaphysics (Oxford 2025), centres on the idea that metaphysics, as traditionally pursued, is bankrupt. There are no established metaphysical truths, only endless attempts to accomplish the unaccomplishable. Regarded as a purely a priori endeavour, it loses its connection to reality and its relevance outside philosophy. Connecting metaphysics to reality puts in competition with physics, a competition it is ‘bound to lose' (2025: 5). The Thomasson way forward for metaphysics is to abandon the pretext of exposing the nature of reality and turn, instead, to ‘conceptual (or linguistic) engineering', the goal of which is not simply to delineate our conceptual categories, but to improve them, render them more fit for purpose. I argue that, on the contrary, metaphysics, done ontologically seriously, complements the sciences especially physics, offering D. C. Williams as a counterexample to Thomassons’ claims. Conceptual engineering might have something to offer, but not as a replacement for metaphysics rightly pursued

Competition (biology) · Connection (principal bundle) · Metaphysics · Mistake · Pretext · Property (philosophy) · Relevance (law) · Origins and Evolution of Life · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

• Naturalism and the Nature of Things

  Donald Williams, Donald T Williams•The Philosophical Review•1944

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