The vague, the assertable, and the omega-knowable
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335066 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ben Holguín (Johns Hopkins University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-24 |
| Publication date | 2025-07-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2025.2527718 |
| OpenAlex | W4412477337 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 38 |
It is widely accepted that knowledge is necessary for proper assertion. More controversial is the thesis that omega-knowledge – infinitely higher-order knowledge – is necessary for proper assertion. Proponents of the ‘KK’ principle take the former thesis to entail the latter, since they take knowledge to entail omega-knowledge. But in Iterated Knowledge, Simon Goldstein argues against the KK principle and in favor of the thesis that omega-knowledge is necessary for proper assertion. This paper argues that reflection on some independently plausible principles about the relationship between knowledge, assertion, and vagueness shows that both Goldstein and the proponents of KK are mistaken. First: if (as is widely accepted) vagueness is a barrier to knowledge, then one can't omega-know that it's vague what one omega-knows. But if omega-knowledge is plentiful, then it's clearly assertable (and thus knowable) that sometimes it's vague what one omega-knows. So if vagueness is a barrier to knowledge, then omega-knowledge can't be necessary for proper assertion, and knowledge can't entail omega-knowledge. Second: even if vagueness isn't a barrier to knowledge, it's a barrier to proper assertion. But this presents a dilemma for Goldstein: either being in a position to assert something entails being in a position to assert that one is in a position to assert it, or it doesn't. If it does, then one can't assert that it's sometimes vague what one is in a position to assert. But that looks like a problem, because it seems clear that one can assert that sometimes it's vague what one is in a position to assert. But if being in a position to assert something doesn't entail being in a position to assert that one is in a position to assert it, then the principle that assertion requires omega-knowledge fails to do the explanatory work Goldstein needs it to do. Either way, we should reject arguments for omega-knowledge anti-skepticism grounded in judgments about proper assertion
Linguistics · Omega · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |