The biological objection against strong AI

Bibliographic Data

ID21335141
AuthorsSebastian Sunday Grève (0000-0001-5315-5733, Institute of Foreign Philosophy at Peking University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-25
Publication date2025-02-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2025.2465369
OpenAlexW4407703576
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited63

According to the biological objection against strong artificial intelligence (AI), machines cannot have human mindedness – that is, they cannot be conscious, intelligent, sentient, etc. in the precise way that a human being typically is – because this requires being alive, and machines are not alive. Proponents of the objection include John Lucas, Hubert Dreyfus, and John Searle. The present paper explains the nature and significance of the biological objection, before arguing that it currently represents an essentially irrational position

Embodied and Extended Cognition · Innovation, Sustainability, Human-Machine Systems · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations

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