Hume on causation
Against the quasi-realist interpretation
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21335232 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alexander Miller (0000-0003-2317-9800, Philosophy Programme, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, autor de correspondencia), Saba Ghoroori (Philosophy Programme, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Páginas | 1-11 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-05-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2353617 |
| OpenAlex | W4397044292 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 11 |
In recent years, a number of philosophers have promoted a quasi-realist (or projectivist) interpretation of Hume's theory of causation. In this paper, we argue against the quasi-realist interpretation of Hume, on the grounds that there is a direct clash between a fundamental element of Hume's system (his empiricist theory of content) and one of the main constraints that governs any form of quasi-realism (and so a fortiori, quasi-realism about causation)
Causation · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Positive economics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |