No way to WAM
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335243 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dirk Kindermann (0000-0003-1821-3605, University of Vienna, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 775-788 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-09 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2021.1984985 |
| OpenAlex | W3205437620 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
Many epistemologists explain the empirically attested contextual variation in knowledge ascriptions by appeal to a kind of warranted assertability maneuver (WAM) that finds the locus of variability in epistemic norms of assertion. I show that this way to WAM fails. It cannot explain the variability of embedded uses of knowledge sentences in assertoric speech acts in which the knowledge sentences are not themselves asserted
Appeal · Assertion · Epistemology · Linguistics · Physics · Political science · Programming language · Variation (astronomy) · Computer Science · Educational Strategies and Epistemologies · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Topic Modeling
Fact
Null
Some observations on factivity
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics
Knowledge, intuition and implicature
Discursive justification and skepticism
Knowledge and implicatures
Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
Adapt or Die
Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manoevres
Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Knowledge and Conversation
Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge
Knowledge and Assertion
Assertion and its Constitutive Norms
| Highly cited | No |
|---|