A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience

Affect as feeling towards value

Bibliographic Data

ID21335300
AuthorsJonathan Mitchell (0000-0002-7008-4655, University of Manchester, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume67
Issue1
Pages1-24
Publication date2024-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2020.1850341
OpenAlexW3026347942
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited25

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states

Affect (linguistics) · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Content (measure theory) · Emotion work · Epistemology · Feeling · Intentionality · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Perception · Value (mathematics) · Art, Aesthetics, and Perception · Communication · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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