Externalist perspectives on meaning change and conceptual stability

Bibliographic Data

ID21335307
AuthorsAnton Alexandrov (0000-0002-2413-4543, LOGOS Research Group, Barcelona, Spain, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume63
Issue9-10
Pages1023-1035
Publication date2020-11-25
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2020.1805709
OpenAlexW3084731804
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited7

In recent debates about conceptual engineering (broadly understood), it appears that the internalist has an explanatory advantage when it comes to accounting for meaning change and conceptual change. In this paper, I argue against this impression. I show how two different varieties of externalism, originalism and anti-individualism, can coherently explain various cases of meaning change, irrespective of whether they involve proper names or kind terms; and also irrespective of whether they occur in everyday, legal, or scientific contexts. I point out which mechanisms and interpretational strategies the originalist and anti-individualist can invoke, relative to their respective background assumptions about the nature of concepts. Furthermore, I offer an argument in favour of the claim that externalism as such has no implications concerning whether concepts can undergo change. I establish this by showing that originalism allows for conceptual change while anti-individualism insists on conceptual stability

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Externalism · Individualism · Internalism and externalism · Meaning (existential) · Political science · Sociology · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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