On justifying case verdicts. A dialectical hypothesis

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21335324
AutoresAdriano Angelucci (University of Urbino, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume68
Fascículo2
Páginas297-317
Data de publicação2025-02-07
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInquiry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2022.2092905
OpenAlexW4293058554
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas43

The method of cases (MOC), as standardly construed, involves an evidential appeal to intuitions. Philosophers, however, often argue for their case verdicts, they offer reasons for accepting their truth. According to Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen – whose ground-breaking case studies first drew attention to this underappreciated phenomenon – their reason-giving would constitute compelling evidence that, contrary to the received view, philosophers relying on MOC regard arguments, not intuitions, as their main justificatory source. This explanatory hypothesis has met with substantial resistance among metaphilosophers. The main goal of this paper is to broaden the theoretical playing field by considering a yet unexplored alternative hypothesis. I argue that said phenomenon in fact admits of an alternative, intuition-friendly explanation in light of a fundamental distinction in justification theory which has been entirely overlooked by the current debate – i.e. the one between justifying a belief and being justified in holding it. This distinction, I suggest, allows one to naturally construe philosophers’ justifying activity as a dialectically motivated kind of proactive reasoning geared toward the goal of maximizing consensus over their verdicts. Once thus construed, it remains compatible with philosophers thinking of intuitions as the main source of their justification

Appeal · Dialectic · Epistemology · Intuition · Phenomenon · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment