Holism about fact and value
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335470 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kenneth Walden (0000-0002-5144-4563, Dartmouth College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 545-569 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-07 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2107062 |
| OpenAlex | W4292200309 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
This paper argues for confirmational holism about facts and values. This position is similar to one defended by (among others) Hilary Putnam, but the argument is importantly different. Whereas Putnam et al. rely on examples of the putative entanglement of facts and values – a strategy which I suggest is vulnerable to parrying – my argument proceeds at a more general level. I argue that the explanation of action can not be separated from our practical reasoning, and for this reason, the ‘webs’ of value and fact judgments are joined in the same way that Quine holds the judgments of mathematics and natural science to be
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Holism · Natural kind · Quine · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Indispensability of Mathematics
Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Inference to the Best Explanation
New work for a theory of universals
The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value
Barriers to Implication
A Philosophy of Culture
Uses of Value Judgments in Science
Normative Reference Magnets
Action and Subtraction
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy
Facts and Principles
| Highly cited | No |
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