Counterpossibles, consequence and context
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335623 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Nolan (0000-0003-0055-0611, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Pages | 1-30 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2326184 |
| OpenAlex | W4392859569 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
What is the connection between valid inference and true conditionals? Many conditional logics require that when A is a logical consequence of B, ‘if B then A’ is true. Taking counterlogical conditionals seriously leads to systems that permit counterexamples to that general rule. However, this leaves those of us who endorse non-trivial accounts of counterpossible conditionals to explain what the connection between conditionals and consequence is. The explanation of the connection also answers a common line of objection to non-trivial counterpossibles, which is based on a transition from valid arguments to the corresponding conditionals. It also contributes to the wider project of illuminating the connections between contexts of utterance, on the one hand, and the truth-conditions of conditionals uttered in those contexts, on the other
Archaeology · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History
| Highly cited | No |
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