Should we worry about conspiracy theorists rejecting experts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335643 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Melina Tsapos (0000-0001-6779-9732, Lund University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2820-2840 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2375774 |
| OpenAlex | W4400584426 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 38 |
Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts. To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little more than rejecting those whom society has collectively deemed as experts. Alternatively, adopting a realist account raises the challenge of determining who the genuine experts are. I argue that the realist account is the more compelling option for pursuing the first question. Moreover, I explore two prevalent accounts from existing literature that prescribe how epistemic agents should respond to expert testimony: the Preemptive View and the Community View. Through an examination using the simulation program Laputa, I demonstrate that both accounts are insufficient. Consequently, I argue that without a clear identification of experts in the broader context of conspiracy theories, the initial concern lacks a solid foundation, and the sense of urgency may be unwarranted
Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence) · Identification (biology) · Political science · Sociology · Worry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy · Psychology
Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories
Epistemic Dependence
Expertise
Epistemic Authority
Conspiracy Theories, Populism, and Epistemic Autonomy
How Can You Spot the Experts? An Essay in Social Epistemology
Who is a Conspiracy Theorist
Are ‘Conspiracy Theories’ So Unlikely to Be True? A Critique of Quassim Cassam’s Concept of ‘Conspiracy Theories’
Betting on Conspiracy
How to make conspiracy theory research intellectually respectable (and what it might be like if it were)
When conspiracy theorists win
The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories
Knowledge in a Social World
Why do people believe Covid-19 conspiracy theories
Of Conspiracy Theories
On Political Conspiracy Theories
Do your own research
The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities
Content Preservation
The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning
Conspiracy Theories
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |