Descartes’ foundation and Borges’ ruins
How to doubt the Cogito
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335664 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Uri D Leibowitz (0000-0001-8008-6059, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Pages | 3053-3066 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2021.2011777 |
| OpenAlex | W4200301254 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false
Cogito ergo sum · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence) · Pace · Physics · Political science · Reasonable Doubt · Skepticism · Borges, Kipling, and Jewish Identity · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Phenomenology Studies · Spanish Philosophy and Literature
Cogito, Ergo Sum
Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen
The Priority of Reason in Descartes
Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle
The Cartesian Circle
Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God
Descartes on the Dubitability of the Existence of Self
Descartes's Diagonal Deduction
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |