Two deflationary accounts of truth

This essay comprises six sections. Section 1 contrasts deflationary accounts of truth with traditional theories. Section 2 evaluates two deflationary views: (i) my use-theoretic Minimalism, which holds that the meaning of ‘true’ lies in speakers’ tendency to accept the Equivalence Schema: ‘The proposition that p is true ↔ p’; and (ii) Wolfgang Künne's definition of ‘x is true’ as ‘(Ep)(x = & p)’, which quantifies into sentence position, departing from classical logic. Section 3 addresses Sten Lindström's critique of Minimalism, arguing it is inadequate. Section 4 raises a challenge to both accounts: whether they can accommodate the plausible idea that some untranslatable statements may still be true. Section 5 examines a paradox stemming from applying the Equivalence Schema to self-referential denials of truth. Finally, Section 6 responds to questions from the 2024 Vienna workshop on truth, which prompted this special issue

Deflation · Equivalence (formal languages) · Proposition · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Section (typography) · Sentence · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science