Irrational trust and its consequences
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335705 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Tallant (0000-0002-8085-3104, University of Nottingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-13 |
| Publication date | 2025-05-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2025.2506130 |
| OpenAlex | W4410496148 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 15 |
With the specific target being three-placed accounts of trust that are prominent within the philosophical literature. Towards the end of the paper, I pursue a particular challenge to the claim that we have irrational trust. I demonstrate that what the challenge shows is that either we can have irrational trust, or else that several views in the literature are false. I (tentatively) suggest that it's better to opt for the conclusion that we can have instances of irrational trust
Business · Economics · Epistemology · Irrational number · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Mathematics · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being · Personality Traits and Psychology · Philosophy · Psychological Treatments and Assessments · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |