Dynamic ‘might’ and correct belief

Bibliographic Data

ID21335752
AuthorsPatrick Skeels (0000-0002-7320-4499, Department of Philosophy, University of California, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume69
Issue2
Pages1139-1184
Publication date2026-02-07
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2023.2249946
OpenAlexW4386492401
LanguageEN
References cited34

Veltman's test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. After motivating the need for an account of the correctness of belief within the dynamic framework, I argue that the few extant accounts in the literature are unsatisfactory. A novel account is proposed that avoids the problems of competing views

Belief revision · Epistemology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Psychology

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