The illusion of the relevance of difficulty in evaluations of moral responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID21335781
AuthorsAsia Ferrin (American University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume68
Issue7
Pages1815-1835
Publication date2025-08-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2022.2126390
OpenAlexW4302028356
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited24

A common intuition is that the more difficult it is for someone to do the right thing, the more praiseworthy she is for succeeding and the less blameworthy she is for failing. Here, I call this the ‘Difficulty Thesis’ and argue that the Difficulty Thesis is false. In Section 2, I briefly describe what I mean by ‘difficulty’ and the Difficulty Thesis. The Difficulty Thesis has strong prima facie appeal, however, why exactly difficulty is morally relevant remains an open and interesting philosophical question. I discuss this briefly in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I argue that the Difficulty Thesis is in fact false. That is, difficulty is not relevant to degrees of praise- and blameworthiness. In Section 5, I offer several explanations for why many are fooled by the illusion of relevance of Difficulty. I argue that difficulty is, at best, an imperfect heuristic with regard to evaluations of praise- and blameworthiness. I also argue that while difficulty is not relevant to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, difficulty is relevant to practices of praise and blame. I conclude, then, that the Difficulty Thesis ought to be rejected

Appeal · Blame · Cognitive psychology · Compatibilism · Epistemology · Illusion · Imperfect · Intuition · Linguistics · Moral responsibility · Political science · Praise · Prima facie · Relevance (law) · Section (typography) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification

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