Foreign ownership and centralized collective bargaining

Direct and indirect influences

Bibliographic Data

ID21349284
AuthorsUwe Jirjahn (0000-0003-1135-7331, Universität Trier, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume64
Issue1
Pages101-123
Publication date2022-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Industrial Relations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-1856 • E-ISSN: 1472-9296
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00221856211056091
OpenAlexW4200190107
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited69

Using firm-level data from Germany, this study examines the link between foreign ownership and the coverage by centralized (multi-employer) bargaining agreements. Conforming to theoretical considerations, the empirical analysis shows that it is important to distinguish between a direct and an indirect influence of foreign ownership on centralized collective bargaining. The direct influence of foreign ownership lowers the probability that a firm is covered by a centralized agreement. The indirect influence works through the unionization of the workforce. If the size of the firm does not exceed a critical level, the indirect influence counteracts the direct influence. Foreign ownership leads to a higher share of union members which, in turn, has a positive influence on the coverage by a centralized agreement. However, in very large firms the indirect influence appears to be negative. Foreign ownership is associated with a lower share of union members

Bargaining power · Business · Collective bargaining · Economic growth · Economics · Foreign direct investment · Foreign ownership · Indirect effect · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Workforce · Employment and Welfare Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions

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