Counterfactual Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21351561 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ginger Schultheis (corresponding author), Journal Of Philosophy Inc |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 120 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 581-614 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/jphil20231201133 |
| OpenAlex | W4388144008 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Stalnaker’s Thesis about indicative conditionals says, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional is equal to the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. Skyrms’s Thesis about counterfactual conditionals says, roughly, that the probability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual conditional equals one’s rational expectation of the chance, at a relevant past time, of its consequent conditional on its antecedent. In this article, I develop a new uniform theory of conditionals that allows us to derive a tenable version of Skyrms’s Thesis from a tenable version of Stalnaker’s Thesis, together with a chance-deference relating rational credence to beliefs about objective chance
Antecedent (behavioral psychology) · Conditional expectation · Conditional probability · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Credence · Econometrics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |