Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21351564 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nathan Robert Howard (0000-0002-6083-458X, corresponding author), Nathan Howard, Journal Of Philosophy Inc |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 97-111 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/jphil202111828 |
| OpenAlex | W3135889620 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
I argue that Davidson’s conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts
Action (physics) · Epistemology · Normative · Normative model of decision-making · Normative social influence · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |