Question framing and sensitivity to consequences in sacrificial moral dilemmas
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21355422 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas J Navarick (0000-0002-4361-848X, Psychology, California State University, Fullerton, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 161 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 25-39 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-4545 • E-ISSN: 1940-1183 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00224545.2020.1749019 |
| PMID | 32268848 |
| OpenAlex | W3015909138 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 36 |
In sacrificial dilemmas, participants judge the morality of killing one person to save several others. For five sacrificial dilemmas, participants rated on separate unidimensional scales how "morally right" and how "morally wrong" they felt such actions would be under six combinations of beneficiaries (strangers, cousins, one's children) and targets (firefighter, bank robber). Framing a survey question in terms of "morally right" potentially primes prescriptive moral norms, directing attention to the beneficiaries; framing it in terms of "morally wrong" potentially primes proscriptive moral norms, directing attention to the targets. Selective attention induced by a question should heighten sensitivity to changes in levels of the corresponding independent variable. Accordingly, ratings of right changed more than ratings of wrong across beneficiaries; ratings of wrong changed more than ratings of right across targets. Question framing can bias moral appraisal by heightening or attenuating attentiveness to individuals who would benefit or suffer from sacrificial action
Epistemology · Framing (construction) · Moral dilemma · Morality · Sociology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Hamilton vs. Kant
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem
On perceptual readiness.
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions
Beyond sacrificial harm
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
“Granny dumping”
Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space
Framing Effect in the Trolley Problem and Footbridge Dilemma
Should I save or should I not kill? How people solve moral dilemmas depends on which rule is most accessible
Sometimes You Feel Like a Nut, Sometimes You Don't
Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality
Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making
The self-importance of moral identity
Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas
The additive nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility
Mapping the moral domain
On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory and measurement
Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists
The Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS)
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |