Reply to Timothy Hinton on Gareth Moore's Philosophy of God
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21363404 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Howard Robinson (0000-0002-2972-5692, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 1097 |
| Pages | 22-29 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | New Blackfriars (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0028-4289 • E-ISSN: 1741-2005 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nbfr.12626 |
| OpenAlex | W3102958591 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
Hinton's defence of Gareth's philosophy is welcome - but I don't think it works. This is because he does not show how, on Gareth's theory, ‘God’ can be referential, and, if it is not referential, then ‘belief in God’ cannot be taken in any literal sense. Sadly, I stand by my original claim that the radical, Phillipsian Wittgensteinianism that Gareth adopts is a form of informal positivism that only allows an expressivist sense to religious, and, indeed, all metaphysical language
Epistemology · Linguistics · Literal (mathematical logic) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Positivism · Theology · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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