Accurate believers are deductively cogent

Bibliographic Data

ID21364045
AuthorsMatthew Hewson (0000-0002-3532-107X, Oxford University Oxford UK, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume56
Issue4
Pages763-786
Publication date2022-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12397
OpenAlexW4200119393
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multi‐premise closed belief set, and not a (merely) single‐premise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief‐sensitive ; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief‐insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the belief‐sensitive over belief‐insensitive notion is defended, as is the choice of this particular belief‐sensitive kind of accuracy coherence over other belief‐sensitive rivals. Our conclusion is that accurate believers are deductively cogent

Argument (complex analysis) · Belief revision · Belief system · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Epistemology · Pairwise comparison · Perspective (graphical) · Premise · Set (abstract data type) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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