Two approaches to metaphysical explanation

Bibliographic Data

ID21364050
AuthorsEzra Rubenstein (0000-0002-6331-773X, University of California Berkeley USA, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume58
Issue4
Pages1107-1136
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12491
OpenAlexW4394680782
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited83

Explanatory metaphysics aspires to explain the less fundamental in terms of the more fundamental. But we should recognize two importantly different approaches to this task. According to the generation approach, more basic features of reality generate (or give rise to) less basic features. According to the reduction approach, less perspicuous ways of representing reality reduce to (or collapse into) more perspicuous ways of representing reality. The main goals of this paper are to present the core differences between the two approaches (§2), to demonstrate the distinction's significance (§3), to provide some resources for adjudicating between the approaches (§4), and to argue that the project of explanatory metaphysics needs both (§5)

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science