This paper might change your mind
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364072 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Josh Dever (Department of Philosophy University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA), Herbert I Schiller (0000-0001-7229-9337, Department of Philosophy University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 863-890 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12336 |
| OpenAlex | W3024465365 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 25 |
Linguistic intervention in rational decision making is standardly captured in terms of information change. But the standard view gives us no way to model interventions involving expressions that only have an attentional effects on conversational contexts. How are expressions with non‐informational content – like epistemic modals – used to intervene in rational decision making? We show how to model rational decision change without information change: replace a standard conception of value (on which the value of a set of worlds reduces to values of individual worlds in the set) with one on which the value of a set of worlds is determined by a selection function that picks out a generic member world. We discuss some upshots of this view for theorizing in philosophy and formal semantics
Epistemology · Function (biology) · Linguistics · Machine learning · Possible world · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Semantics (computer science) · Set (abstract data type) · Value (mathematics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Risk and Rationality
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Defaults in update semantics
Epistemic Modals
On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary
Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
Information structure in discourse
Possibility
Belief as Question‐Sensitive
Dynamics of Epistemic Modality
Common Ground
Imperatives and modals
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |