Happiness and desire satisfaction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364076 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Heathwood (0000-0002-9428-3720, University of Colorado Boulder, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 57-83 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12347 |
| OpenAlex | W3044175795 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 29 |
This paper develops and defends a novel version of a relatively neglected category of theory of the nature of happiness: the desire‐satisfaction theory. My account is similar in its fundamentals to Wayne Davis's theory of happiness‐as‐subjective‐desire‐satisfaction. After arguing that this is the best general way to proceed for the desire‐based approach, I develop an improved version of subjective desire satisfactionism in light of recent arguments in the happiness literature
Epistemology · Happiness · Life satisfaction · Sociology · Subjective well-being · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?
The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire
Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self and Others
Affective and Non-Affective Desire
An Analysis of Prudential Value
The experience requirement on well-being
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism
The problem of defective desires
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare1
Critique of Practical Reason (Hackett Classics Series)
Wanting
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |