Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21364083
AutoresMelissa Fusco (0000-0001-6512-2357, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen58
Número3
Páginas616-643
Fecha de publicación2024-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12459
OpenAlexW4381848878
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas36

I respond to a dilemma for Causal Decision Theory (CDT) under determinism, posed in Adam Elga's paper “Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist”. The treatment I present highlights (i) the status of laws as predictors, and (ii) the consequences of decision dependence, which arises natively out of Jeffrey Conditioning and CDT's characteristic equation. My argument leverages decision dependence to work around a key assumption of Elga's proof: to wit, that in the two problems he presents, the CDTer must employ subjunctive‐suppositional (rather than evidential) transformations of a shared prior

Argument (complex analysis) · Business decision mapping · Causal decision theory · Causal model · Computer security · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Determinism · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Evidential decision theory · Evidential reasoning approach · Key (lock) · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Statistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science