Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364092 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Leah Henderson (0000-0002-3224-0936, Department of Theoretical Philosophy University of Groningen Groningen The Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 513-529 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12367 |
| OpenAlex | W3159477301 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 51 |
There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher‐order evidence. The existing dilemmas can be defused by adopting a ‘two‐dimensional’ representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first‐order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher‐order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such a two‐dimensional representation is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities
Algorithm · Conviction · Doxastic logic · Economics · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Political science · Representation (politics) · State (computer science) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |