Sleeping Beauty and the demands of non‐ideal rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364111 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Wolfgang Schwarz (0000-0002-9965-1115, University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1072-1092 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12545 |
| OpenAlex | W4407374539 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 63 |
If an agent can't live up to the demands of ideal rationality, fallback norms come into play that take into account the agent's limitations. A familiar human limitation is our tendency to lose information. How should we compensate for this tendency? The Seeping Beauty problem allows us to isolate this question, without the confounding influence of other human limitations. If the coin lands tails, Beauty can't preserve whatever information she has received on Monday: she is bound to violate the norms of ideal diachronic rationality. The considerations that support these norms, however, can still be used. I investigate how Beauty should update her beliefs so as to maximize the expected accuracy of her new beliefs. The investigation draws attention to important but neglected questions about the connection between rational belief and evidential support, about the status of ideal and non‐ideal norms, about the dependence of epistemic norms on descriptive facts, and about the precise formulation of expected accuracy measures. It also sheds light on the puzzle of higher‐order evidence
Aesthetics · Art · Beauty · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Justifying Conditionalization
The General Theory of Second Best
Belief and the Will
Accuracy and Coherence
What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean
Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents
Updating without evidence
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem
The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization
Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization
Sleeping Beauty and Self-location
Horgan on Sleeping Beauty
Coherence as an ideal of rationality
Regret and instability in causal decision theory
Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty
Beauty and the Bets
Self-location is no problem for conditionalization
A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection
In Defense of Reflection
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Updating as Communication
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
Belief Update across Fission
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |