Controlling our reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID21364155
AuthorsSophie Keeling (0000-0002-7846-453X, LOGOS, Universitat de Barcelona Barcelona Spain, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume57
Issue4
Pages832-849
Publication date2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12431
OpenAlexW4289837471
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited65

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting‐for‐a‐reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics

Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Control (management) · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Law and economics · Orthodoxy · Scope (computer science) · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access